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T
here seems to be a perception among participants in U.S. ﬁnancial
markets that if a large banking organization were to get in trouble, the
government would, under most circumstances, intervene to prevent its
failure(orlimitthelossestouninsuredcreditorsuponfailure). Thispossibility
ofagovernmentbailoutiscommonlyreferredtoasthe“too-big-to-fail”policy.
The idea behind this belief is that, in general, policymakers will be inclined
to bail out institutions which are considered to be of “systemic” importance;
that is, institutions whose potential failure could threaten the stability of the
entire ﬁnancial system.
The expectation of contingent bailouts tends to create efﬁciency costs in
the economy. In general, a bank tends to become larger and riskier if its
uninsured creditors believe that they will beneﬁt from too-big-to-fail (TBTF)
coverage. In this article we provide a formal discussion to clarify the origin
of these distortions and review empirical evidence on the relative importance
of these distortions in the U.S. banking system.
The TBTF subject is a timely issue. Stern and Feldman (2004) argue that
the problem of TBTF is actually getting worse. They identify the increasing
concentrationandcomplexityinbankingasthemainreasonforthisdeteriora-
tion. Although their opinion is certainly not shared by everyone, the mere
possibility of such a costly distortion is enough to justify further study of this
issue.
The too-big-to-fail terminology sometimes can be misleading. While the
systemic importance of an organization tends to be closely related to its size,
this is not always the case. For example, a handful of U.S. banks are not
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particularly large but are still often perceived as too big to fail because they
perform an essential activity in the smooth functioning of ﬁnancial markets
and the payment system. Furthermore, the TBTF problem is not exclusive to
banks. Otherﬁnancialintermediarieslikelargeclearinghousesandsigniﬁcant
players in the mortgage securities market are often perceived as too big to
fail. In this article, however, we will restrict our focus to traditional banking
activitiesand, forsimplicity, willconsidersizeasthemainvariableassociated
with the likelihood of being bailed out.
U.S. banks face a complex regulatory environment that guides and modi-
ﬁes their behavior. The perception of a TBTF policy is just one of several
featuresthatcharacterizesthisenvironment. Twootherimportantfeaturestend
to interact with TBTF: deposit insurance and the failure-resolution policy.1
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is an independent
government agency that provides deposit insurance to U.S. banking institu-
tions. The current insurance system protects a depositor’s insured funds up
to $100,000, including principal and interest. The FDIC administers two
insurance funds: the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), which is dedicated to com-
mercial banks, and the Savings Associations Insurance Fund (SAIF) for the
savings and loans banks. Member-banks contribute periodic payments to a
common pool, which is then used to ﬁnance the insurance liabilities in case of
abankfailure. Priorto1993, allbankspaidtotheFDICthesamecontribution
per dollar of deposits. However, since 1993, the contributions are partially
based on risk. Under this new system, institutions are grouped into nine risk
categoriesaccordingtotheirlevelofcapitalizationandtheratingobtaineddur-
ing supervisory examinations. Banks belonging to the higher risk categories
arerequiredtopayhigherpremiums. Therangeofpremiumsisupdatedsemi-
annually by the FDIC according to the funding needs of the insurance funds.
Presently, the premiums range from 0 to 0.27 percent of deposits. Since 92
percent of banks satisfy the requirements for a 0 percent assessment, they do
not contribute to the fund. The target size of the fund is 1.25 percent of total




ing in a BIF deﬁcit of $7 billion, Congress passed the FDIC ImprovementAct
(FDICIA) in December 1991.2 TheAct introduced risk-based premiums and
new regulations for bank-failure resolution. The new rules specify a course
of action for regulators to enforce adjustments in undercapitalized banks and,
in this way, mitigate the potential losses to the fund associated with bank
failures. Before FDICIA, the power to close a failing insured bank rested
1 See Hetzel (1991) for a discussion of TBTF and the timely closing of insolvent banks.
2 For a comprehensive survey of FDICIA, see Benston and Kaufman (1997).H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 23
with the chartering authority (either the Comptroller of the Currency or state
governments). Nowadays, an institution whose capital ratio falls below 2 per-
cent faces closure by the FDIC if the shortfall is not corrected within 90 days
(see Walter [2004] for details). While the regulatory reforms introduced in
FDICIAlimittheprotectionofuninsuredcreditors, Section141stillconsiders
the possibility of a TBTF bailout. This “systemic risk” exception attempts to
increasescrutinyoverbankbailoutsbyrequiringthatboththeFederalReserve
and the Treasury sign off on a rescue.3
Evidently, the complex deposit insurance system—in combination with




system involves premium payments that do not fully reﬂect risk, banks tend
to become riskier to exploit the potential net transfer to their creditors under
the contingency of failure. We also study partial coverage and the interaction
between deposit insurance and a TBTF policy. In particular, we show that the
TBTF policy creates not only a risk distortion but also a size distortion, and
that one distortion tends to increase the value of the other (and vice versa),
creating a perverse ampliﬁcation effect.
We model risk in a simple yet useful way. We consider only the risk of
failureinthedecisionofbanks. Thissimpliﬁcationisappropriateforthestudy
ofTBTF,whichislinkedonlytotheeventsinthedistributionofoutcomesthat
result in failure. Of course, in general, the risk of failure is a consequence of
a set of risky decisions made by banks. These decisions also imply a complex
distribution of returns when the bank does not fail. We abstract from this
aspect of the risk involved in banking and assume that if the bank does not
fail, it has a ﬁxed return R.
Studying the cost and beneﬁts of TBTF bailouts is difﬁcult. Failures of
large banks are low-probability events. As a consequence, we do not have
sufﬁcient data to fully identify the pattern of behavior (of bankers, policy-
makers, and creditors) linked to bailouts. Also, the indirect (moral hazard)
effect of TBTF on the investment portfolio of banks is difﬁcult to discern. At
the same time, the decision to bail out a particular bank depends on a large
number of circumstances, and reaching general conclusions based on speciﬁc
eventsisnotgoodpractice. Forexample, observingthatarelativelyimportant
failing bank is not bailed out may help elucidate the position of policymakers
3 Regulators often argue that even if a troubled ﬁnancial institution is not closed, this does
not mean that all its major claimants are protected from losses. In general, the regulators of a
troubled institution might have its management removed and its existing equity extinguished. Also,
sometimes signiﬁcant (partial) losses might be imposed on uninsured creditors and counterparties
(Greenspan 2000). Clearly, all these instruments will contribute to limit the distortions created by
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with respect to the TBTF policy. However, just one situation is probably not
enough evidence to conclude that TBTF is not a problem. A different bank,
in different situations, may actually be bailed out. In other words, it may be
useful to think about the bailout event as probabilistic, which is the approach
that we take in this article. In the next section, we present a model where the
probability of a TBTF bailout is strictly between zero and one (for a relevant
set of bank sizes), and (on this range) such a probability is increasing in the
size of the bank.
In the second section of this article, we revisit some empirical evidence
ﬁrst presented by Boyd and Gertler (1994), who studied the relationship be-
tweenbankperformanceandassetsizeintheUnitedStatesandconcludedthat
the evidence indicates the emergence of a TBTF problem in the late 1980s.
We extend that analysis to the period 1991–2003, revealing that the patterns
justifying Boyd and Gertler’s concerns are no longer in the data. We provide
some interpretations for this change.
It is important to point out that we are not discussing why a TBTF policy
may be in place. Rather, we assume that there is a TBTF policy and then
identify its potential effects on the size and risk decisions of banks. This
assumption simpliﬁes the exposition and allows us to focus exclusively on the
distortions introduced byTBTF. But the simpliﬁcation does not come without
cost. In particular, we do not discuss two important issues related to the
existence of TBTF bailouts: the potential beneﬁts of avoiding spillovers and
bank runs and the time inconsistency problem faced by policymakers. We
refertheinterestedreadertotheexcellentdiscussioninChapter2ofSternand
Feldman (2004). However, we would like to stress here that we consider the
study of those issues essential for a full understanding of the TBTF problem.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 1 we
present a simple model of the size and investment decision of competitive
banks and study this decision under different explicit and implicit deposit
insurance schemes. The model allows us to identify the distortions that the
different possible schemes create on the level of risk taken by banks and the
size of their operations. In Section 2, we review empirical evidence aimed
at determining if the U.S. banking system functions under the perceptions of
an implicit TBTF government insurance scheme. The last section provides
concluding remarks.
1. A SIMPLE MODEL
Consider an economy with a large number of banks and a large number of
agents that play the role of potential depositors. Each agent has 300 units
of funds available, and they can either deposit some (or all) of their funds at
a bank or invest them in a safe asset which provides a gross rate of return,
given by r. The banks make risky investments and may fail with a certainH. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 25
probability, π. In the case that a bank does not fail, depositors get R units per
unit deposited at that bank. We assume that R can take values in the interval
[0,R], where R is an upper bound of the set of possible gross returns on bank
deposits. Furthermore, we assume that banks can charge a fee, F, to each
depositor.
Assume that the probability of bank failure, π, is increasing in R. This
assumption captures the idea that taking higher risks is necessary to obtain
higher returns. For simplicity, we assume that π(R)is linear in R with slope,
a. When the bank fails, we assume that no resources are left at the bank to
pay depositors. In other words, without government intervention, depositors
will get zero from the bank in case of failure. For reasons that will become












x, offundsinthebank, wherex cantakeoneofthreepossiblevalues: 50, 100,
or 300. Furthermore, all depositors want to have at least 50 units deposited at
the bank. We do not model explicitly the reasons for this minimum deposit,
but the idea is that all agents wish to have at least some bank balances for
settlement of “essential” payments.4
Finally, banks can choose their size. Let ξ be the proportion of the total
populationofagentsmakingadepositinaparticularbank. Tomakethechoice
ofξ interesting,weassumethecostcperdepositorofrunningabankisconvex
in ξ with a minimum at ξo. The idea behind this assumption is that an optimal
size of operation for banks exists and is associated with the size ξo. Running
a bank that is too small (i.e., smaller than ξo) increases the operational cost
per depositor; and running a bank that is too large (i.e., larger than ξo) also
increases the cost.
Weassumethatbankscompetetoattractdepositors. Inequilibrium,banks
earn zero proﬁts and choose R and ξ so as to make the expected payoff to a
depositor as high as possible. If a bank were not to follow such a strategy,
some other bank would arrange its choices of R and ξ in order to attract all
the depositors from the ﬁrst bank. This equilibrium concept is standard in the
banking literature. All agents and banks are identical, and in equilibrium they
behave symmetrically. As a consequence, the equilibrium value of ξ is a good
proxy for the size of the representative bank.
We now study different banking arrangements and their effects on the risk
of failure and the size chosen by the banks.
4 The discreteness in the size of deposits is assumed only for the sake of simplicity. It allows
us to capture the main reasons driving agents’ decisions without complicating the calculations.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Optimal Return-Risk Combination
r = 1/4a
(1 -   (R))R
1/2a 1/a 0 R R
Notes: In a laissez-faire system, banks set the return RL = 1/2a, which maximizes the
expected return per unit deposited (net of fees) given by (1 − π(R))R.
Laissez-faire System
Consider ﬁrst the case of a laissez-faire banking system—that is, one with-
out any government intervention. The laissez-faire equilibrium provides an
important benchmark for our evaluation of alternative explicit and implicit
deposit insurance systems in the following subsections. Under laissez faire,
the expected payoff to a depositor is given by
(1 − π(R))xR + π(R)0 − F,
where the equilibrium fee, F, will cover the operational costs per depositor,
c(ξ). Let us call RL and ξL the laissez-faire equilibrium values of R and ξ.
These values maximize the payoff to depositors and, hence, must satisfy the












which imply that RL equals 1/2a and ξL equals ξo. Note that RL is the value
of R that maximizes the payoff, (1 − π(R))xR (see Figure 1).H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 27
To complete the analysis, we need to determine if the depositors would
ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to deposit in these banks any amount in excess of 50 units.
If an agent deposits the minimum 50 units of its funds in a bank and the




50RL − c(ξL) + 250r.
We need to compare this alternative with that of depositing any other feasible
amount, x,greater than 50 (in particular, x = 100 or 300). The net beneﬁt of




(x − 50)RL − (x − 50)r.
Recall that we assumed that r = 1/4a. Then, since (1−π(RL))RL = 1/4a,
we obtain that the net beneﬁt is zero, and for any amount in excess of 50,
depositors would be indifferent between making an investment or a deposit.
It is important to note that the model presented here has no inherent inter-
action between size and risk, even though in reality there may be reasons to
believe that a bank’s size and risk of failure can be associated in some funda-




We will consider four different deposit insurance systems. The systems differ
from one another in the structure of premiums and the coverage that they
provide.
We start with a deposit insurance system that provides full coverage of
lossesandinwhichbankspaytotheinsurancefundalump-sumﬁxedpremium,
T, independent of bank size. While this kind of ﬁxed premium seems unreal-
istic, such an extreme assumption is useful to illustrate how misalignments
in the premium structure can create size distortions. In this simple model,
designing the right premium structure to avoid this kind of size distortion is
straightforward, and we describe such a structure below.




(1 − π(R))xR + π(R)xR− F, (1)
where F = c(ξ) + T/ξ. Let us denote the solution to this problem with
(RD1,ξD1). It is then clear that under full coverage the banks will choose
RD1 = R, the maximum value of the possible (risky) returns. Recall that
the probability of failure of a bank is increasing in R and, hence, by setting
RD1 equaltoR, bankswillbeindirectlymaximizingtheprobabilityoffailure.
Banks follow this strategy because the insurance premium that a bank pays28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Optimal Bank Size
0
c (  ) + T/
T(  )
c(  )
Notes: The size of a bank that minimizes the per-depositor cost of operation c(ξ) is
given by ξo. When the bank is paying a ﬁxed lump-sum premium T to the deposit
insurance fund, it will increase its size to ξD1.
doesnotdependontherisktakenbythebank,and,furthermore,fullinsurance
coverage implies that neither the bank nor its depositors face any downside
from selecting higher levels of risk.
With respect to the equilibrium size of banks, we have that the value of ξ







It is then straightforward to see that ξD1 >ξ o. Recall that ξo was the size
of the bank that minimizes the cost of operation c(ξ). Here, however, by
becoming large, the bank reduces the per capita cost of deposit insurance for
depositors. Hence, the optimal size of the bank is larger than the one that
minimizes operational costs. In other words, the lump-sum premium distorts
the optimal-size decision by banks (see Figure 2).
To avoid the size distortion, the deposit insurance fund could make the
premium, T, dependent on the size of the bank. This structure of premiums
makessensetotheextentthat,foragivenlevelofrisk,largerbankswillimpose
higher costs to the insurance fund. Suppose, for example, that T = bξ. Then,H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 29
it is straightforward to show that the bank will choose to be of the optimal
size ξo.
While this kind of premium scheme will solve the size distortion, there
still remains the risk distortion. In fact, under this structure of premiums,
banks would still choose to maximize the probability of failure. Of course,
the fund could implement alternative regulations to limit the amount of risk
takenbybanks. Forexample,itcouldrestrictthetypesofinvestmentsallowed
to banks so that the bank would not be able to choose a level of R as high
as R. However, this model is too simple to study these more sophisticated
regulations.
One other possibility would be to make the premium contingent not only
on size, but also on risk. In fact, by choosing T to equal π(R)xRξ, the
insurance fund would give banks the necessary incentives to choose R =
RL, the same rate that banks would choose under laissez faire. In general,
though, precisely assessing the risk taken by banks is difﬁcult, and we can
expect that the observed premium payments will not fully correct the risk
distortion introduced by deposit insurance (Prescott 2002). For simplicity, in
what follows we will assume the extreme case in which the premium only
corrects the size distortion and is given by T = bξ.
Thelastfeatureofdepositinsurancethatwewishtostudyispartialcover-
age. To be precise, suppose that in the case when a bank fails, the deposit
insurance fund covers only up to 100 units of funds per depositor. Then,
banks will choose the risk and size that solve the following problem:
max
R,ξ
(1 − π(R))xR + π(R)min{x,100}R − c(ξ) − b.
Let us call the solution (RD2,ξD2). Since the total premium, T, is increasing
with size, there will not be a size distortion in the decision of banks and
therefore, ξD2 equals ξo. With respect to the level of risk-return, R, the choice
of banks will depend on whether the typical depositor has more or less than
100 units deposited at a bank.
For x ≤ 100, the insurance provided is effectively full insurance. Then,
as we saw before in the full-coverage case, depositors would ﬁnd it most
beneﬁcial if banks maximize the risk-return combination.
Only if depositors have x>100 does the partial coverage provide in-
centives to reduce risk at banks. In the banking literature, these depositors
have been named “uninsured depositors.” This terminology is not completely
precise to the extent that all depositors receive insurance for the funds be-
low the 100 limit. However, the terminology does convey the idea that these
depositors are the ones susceptible to the risk of failure of their bank.
The coverage limit helps reduce the risk distortion but in general will not
be enough to fully correct it. To see this, suppose that the typical depositor
deposits 300 units of funds at the bank. Then, the bank will choose a level of30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
















Recall that RL = 1/2a is the value of R that makes the left-hand side of
equation (2) equal to zero (see Figure 1). Hence, since the right-hand side of
this equation is positive, RA must be greater than RL, and the risk distortion
is still present. For most cases, RA will be smaller than R, and we can say
that, in the presence of uninsured depositors, the insurance limit can partially
resolve the risk distortion introduced by deposit insurance.5
From the previous discussion we can then conclude that RD2 is either
equal to RA (if x>1 0 0 )o rt oR (if x ≤ 100) and, hence, greater than RL in
either case. To determine the actual value that RD2 will take in equilibrium,
we need to establish whether the typical depositor would be willing to deposit
more than 100 units in a bank. The payoff from depositing more than 100








Alternatively, suppose that the agent deposits only 100 units at a bank and





− b + 200r.
Since(1−π(RD2))RD2 <r(seeFigure1),itiseasytoseethatdepositing100
units at a bank and the rest in the safe investment is the best strategy. Another
alternative for the agent is to hold three deposit accounts of 100, each one at
a different bank. This alternative will dominate both the 300-unit deposit and
the alternative involving the safe asset described above. In fact, if a depositor
canopenanynumberoftheseaccounts,thenthe100-unitlimitwouldneverbe
relevant. It should be said, though, that opening accounts in several different
banks involves transaction costs that are not being explicitly modeled here.
One possibility for reducing these transaction costs is for the depositor to
delegate this activity to a broker. However, in the U.S. system, brokered
deposits are subject to regulations enforced by the supervisory agencies. For
thesakeofsimplicity, inwhatfollowswewillassumethatdepositorscanonly
have one bank account in the system.
Summarizing, the typical depositor in this banking system will have only
deposits for 100 units or less, and banks will choose RD2 = R—that is, the
rate of return that corresponds to the highest feasible risk of failure. In other
words, even though partial coverage has the potential for limiting risk-taking
5 If x is greater than 100 (but less than 300), RA may still equal R. Here, then, the
discreteness of the size of deposits simpliﬁes calculations.H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 31
behavior by banks, it also creates incentives for depositors to stay below the
limit, thereby undermining the disciplining mechanism.
Too Big to Fail
Suppose now that with probability, p, the bank is bailed out upon failure. To
show that the bailout is spurred by the fear that a large organization’s failure
will disrupt the entire ﬁnancial sector, we assume that p is increasing in the
bank’s size, ξ. This is a simple way to capture the too-big-to-fail policy. We
still consider the case where a deposit insurance system with partial coverage
is in place. Hence, the too-big-to-fail policy has consequences for the payoff
ofonlythosedepositorswithdepositsabovethelimit. Thepayofftodepositors
in the event of a bank failure is given by the function:
 (R,ξ) ≡ min{x,100}R + p(ξ)max{0,x− 100}R.




(1 − π(R))xR + π(R) (R,ξ)− c(ξ) − b, (3)
where the objective function is the expected payoff to the representative de-
positor. Let us call the solution to this problem (RT,ξT). It is useful to start
withtheextremecaseofbanksthataresolargethattheprobabilityofabailout
is unity (i.e., p(ξT) = 1). Then, problem (3) reduces to the full-coverage de-
posit insurance system we studied at the beginning of the previous subsection,
and banks in equilibrium chose RT = R, which implies that the risk of failure
would be maximized.
In the general case when the probability of bailout, p, is between zero
and one, the solution to problem (3) suggests some interesting insights about
the distortions introduced by the too-big-to-fail policy. This policy is relevant
only for those agents that have uninsured deposits. Suppose then, that the
typical depositor of the bank has x>100. The partial derivatives of the

























 (RT,ξT) + π(RT) R(RT,ξT)





= π(R) ξ(R,ξ). (5)
Since  R(R,ξ) and  ξ(R,ξ) are both positive, RT >R L and ξT >ξ o.I n
other words, the too-big-to-fail policy induces banks to become larger and
riskier than in a laissez-faire system. Furthermore, by comparing expression
(4)withexpression(2)(intheprevioussubsection)weseethat, ingeneral, RT
willbegreaterthanRA, whichwasthereturnchosenbyabankwithuninsured
depositors under no contingent-bailout policy.
Oneremainingquestioniswhetherdepositorswouldwanttodepositfunds
in excess of 100 in a banking system like the one we study in this subsection.





300RT + π(RT)(1 + 2p(ξ))100RT.
Comparingthispayoffwiththepayofffromdepositingonly100unitsoffunds






200 + π(RT)p(ξ)200RT. (6)
Since RT will generally be greater than RL, we know that the ﬁrst term in
expression (6) is negative. However, the second term is positive, and for a
largeenoughbailout-probability,p,itwouldcompensateforthelossintheﬁrst
term. It is then possible in this banking system for agents to ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to deposit all 300 units of funds at the bank.
Anotherinterestingobservationthatresultsfromexpressions(4)and(5)is
theinteractionthatexistsbetweensizeandriskunderthetoo-big-to-failpolicy.
Note that the right-hand side of expression (4) is increasing in p (which, in
turn, is increasing in ξ). Then, the larger the bank, the larger the value of R
the bank will wish to implement. Similarly, the right-hand side of expression
(5) is increasing in R, and, hence, the higher the risk taken by a bank, the
higher the incentives to increase its size. The reason for this complementarity
between size and risk is that riskier banks are more likely to beneﬁt from the
possibility of bailouts (they are more likely to fail). Therefore, those banks
are the ones that would like to increase the bailout probability, p, an objective
that can be pursued by increasing the size of the banking organization.
This interaction captures the idea of a “virtuous circle” induced by an
autonomous reduction on the probability of bailout (Stern and Feldman 2004,
21). Suppose that the appointment of a “conservative” regulator reduces the
value of p for all values of ξ. This reduction in p will reduce the value
RT chosen by banks according to expression (4), which, in turn, will reduce
the equilibrium size, ξT. A smaller ξT further lowers the risk taken by banks,
reducingthefailureprobabilityandcreatingavirtuouscirclethatsigniﬁcantly
reduces the likelihood of failure and bailout events.H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 33
As we have seen, the existence of a TBTF policy has two effects: it
creates a size distortion in the banking industry, and it tends to accentuate
the risk distortion that was already present under deposit insurance (i.e., RT
is greater than RA). A commonly proposed policy to limit the effects of
perceived implicit government guarantees is to limit the size of banks so that
the probability p is equal to zero. Suppose, for example, that there is a bank
size, ξp, such that p(ξ) = 0 for all ξ ≤ ξp. Then, by limiting banks to be
no larger than ξp, the government can eliminate the risk distortion originated
in the TBTF perception. In general, however, limiting the size of banks will
increase operational cost unless ξo ≤ ξp. When the value of ξ is restrained
by regulation to be below ξp, the value of R that banks choose solves a
problem equivalent to the last problem studied in the previous subsection. It
is somewhat ironic then that, in our model, limiting the size of banks to be
smallerthanξp impliesthatbankswillchooseRD2 = R,whichcouldincrease
the riskiness in banking.
Another possible policy to limit the size of these distortions is to imple-
ment a system of “coinsurance” (Feldman and Stern 2004). The idea is that
whenever a bank fails and gets bailed out, uninsured depositors will obtain
only a proportion θ<1 of their deposits in excess of the insurance limit. The
payoff in the event of a bank failure is now given by the function,
 (R,ξ,θ) = min{x,100}R + p(ξ)θ max{0,x− 100}R.
The bank problem is the same as in expression (3) but where  (R,ξ,θ)
replaces  (R,ξ). The solution to this problem will be a function of the
parameter θ. Let us call such a solution (RC,ξC). It is easy to see that for
θ = 1w eh a v e(RC,ξC) = (RT,ξT). However, for θ lower than unity, RC
is lower than RT, and ξC is lower than ξT.6 In other words, the coinsurance
system reduces the incentives for banks to become bigger and riskier under a
TBTF policy.
The deposit insurance premium, T, could be designed to reduce the size
distortion induced by the TBTF policy. In particular, if the premium per
unit deposited, b, is made increasing in the size of the bank, banks will have
less incentive to become large, which, in turn, would limit the inﬂuence of
the TBTF perception. The idea behind this strategy is important and can
be restated in more general terms: whenever the TBTF problem is present,
designing the structure of the deposit insurance premium to be neutral with
respect to size (that is, in our model, T = bξ) may not be optimal.
Finally, another way to control the risk-taking behavior of banks in the
presence of a TBTF distortion is to directly limit the bank’s activities via
supervisory exams. In our simple model, this strategy amounts to reducing
6 The solution RC is lower than RT as long as the coinsurance system does not make the
optimal size of deposits equal 100 units or less.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the acceptable values of R that the bank may choose, or in other words, to
lower the upper bound on returns, R, a parameter in the model.7
2. THE ELUSIVE EVIDENCE
Boyd and Gertler (1994) look back at the banking troubles of the 1980s and
ﬁnd that “large banks were mainly responsible for the unusually poor perfor-
mance of the overall industry” (p.2). They attribute this feature of the data
to the combination of two main factors: deregulation and too-big-to-fail. In
particular, they argue that after the collapse of Continental Illinois Bank in
1984, it became clear that large banks were subject to a TBTF policy.8 Using
apanelofU.S.bankdatafortheperiod1984–1991theyconcludethatarobust
negativecorrelationexistsbetweensizeandperformanceandsuggestthatthis
correlation may be indicative of an increased perception of a TBTF subsidy.
The idea behind this strategy is that banks that are riskier ex ante, are
also more likely to perform poorly ex post. Moreover, riskier banks, as a
consequence of having more spread distribution of returns, tend to have a
higher probability of failure.9 Combining these two hypotheses implies that
poorly performing banks have a higher probability of failure. Then Boyd and
Gertler (1994, 15) postulate that “by examining ex post returns we can get
some feel for the outer tails of the distributions.” As we saw in the previous
section, under the inﬂuence of a TBTF policy, banks will tend to increase
the probability of failure. It is, of course, not obvious that increasing the
probability of failure is always associated with an increase in the overall risk
ofthebank. Similarly,riskierbanksdonotalwaysperformpoorly,onaverage,
relativetolessriskybanks. However,datalimitationssuggestthat,inprinciple,
the proposed link between risk, poor performance, and likelihood of failure
may be a useful working strategy.
BoydandGertlerusethedecreasingtrendinU.S.bankproﬁtabilityduring
the 1980s as a starting point for their study. Speciﬁcally, they stress the fact
that proﬁtability was signiﬁcantly below its 1970s average by the late 1980s.
OurFigure3illustratesthisfact. Weplottheannualnetincomeasapercentage
of total assets for U.S. insured commercial banks. We divide banks in two
groups, thosewithmorethan$10billionintotalassets(largebanks)andthose
with less than that amount. The decline in proﬁtability during the 1980s is
7 Our model does not allow us to study another form of controlling the risk-taking behavior
by banks: capital requirements. See Prescott (2001) for a good formal introduction to the subject.
8 In September 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency testiﬁed to the U.S. Congress that 11
bank holding companies were too big to fail (see O’Hara and Shaw 1990).
9 In the previous section we did not allow for general distributions of returns which are an
integral part of the interpretation for the evidence in this section. The link between the distribution
of returns and the probability of failure is a technical issue that is not essential for understanding
the incentives distortion introduced by TBTF, which was the main subject of the previous section.H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 35
Figure 3 Bank Performance and Size
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Source: FDIC Quarterly Banking Proﬁle.
common for the two groups.10 However, it is clear from the ﬁgure that large
banks experienced an especially turbulent time during the second half of the
1980s. What is even more interesting is that after 1991, bank proﬁtability
recovered across the board to levels above those in the 1970s, staying fairly
stable since then.
In summary, Figure 3 puts in perspective the sample period used by Boyd
and Gertler and may cast some doubt on the robustness of their results. For
this reason, we extend Boyd and Gertler’s empirical analysis to include the
data from 1992 to 2003.
Figure 4 presents the average return on assets for banks of different sizes.
One of the main motivations for Boyd and Gertler’s conclusions is the hump-
10 Keeley (1990) argues that banks became riskier during the 1980s as a consequence of a
generalized decrease in franchise value across the industry. Franchise value can help control risk-
taking behavior by banks because bank owners fear losing this value upon failure. The evolution
of banks’ franchise value is an important determinant of their behavior, but, unfortunately, we will
not have much to say about it in this article. See Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strahan (1996) for
further discussion of this issue.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Notes: We use data for all insured commercial U.S. banks (except credit card banks). To
construct return on assets we divide annual net income by total assets. We consider each
annual observation for each bank as the basic data entry in the calculation of averages
across sizes (i.e., we do not take time averages for each bank). The total number of
observations is around 120,000 for 1983–1991 and 110,000 for 1992–2003.
Sources: Report of Condition and Income Data (Call Report); Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Web page.
shaped pattern of the ﬁrst panel of Figure 4. Large banks performed relatively
poorly during that period, presumably because of the improper pricing of risk
induced by the TBTF distortion.11 However, the second panel shows that in
the period after 1991, the return on assets experienced by banks was, in fact, a
monotone-increasing function of size. There are two competing explanations
11 Banks with less that $50 million in assets also performed worse than the middle-sized
banks. This pattern may be the consequence of the inability of small banks to exploit economies
of scale.H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 37
for this change in pattern. Perhaps the hump-shaped pattern observed in the
1983–1991 period was the result of a special event at the end of the 1980s that
hit hardest the performance of large banks. In this case, the pattern may not
be related to a TBTF perception, and when no special event took place in the
1992–2003 period, the pattern disappeared. The other interpretation for the
change in the pattern is that after 1991, changes on banking regulation and
other policies induced a decrease in the likelihood of TBTF bailouts.
Before discussing the relevance of these two alternative explanations, we
follow Boyd and Gertler’s methodology and check whether the change in
pattern just discussed is robust to controlling for regional effects. The idea
behindthisexerciseisthattheperformanceofbanksmaybedrivenbyregional
economic shocks. For example, if most of the large banks in the country
are in a region that experienced an especially unfavorable shock during the
periodunderstudy, thenitispossibletoﬁndthat, onaverage, mid-sizedbanks
outperformed large banks just as a consequence of “location” effects.
While this type of “robustness” check may have been important for the
1983–1991 period, there are a priori reasons to believe that the adjustment is
bound to be insigniﬁcant for the sample period of 1992–2003. First, several
large banks today have nationwide operations and, hence, are less exposed to
businessﬂuctuationsinspeciﬁcregions. Second,lookingatbankperformance
across regions during the 1992–2003 period does not reveal any clear regional
disparities. The situation was not the same in the sample period studied by
Boyd and Gertler, when the west-central region of the South and the west-
central region of the Midwest experienced severe regional banking shocks.
LetusdenotebyDr
j, adummyvariableindicatingthatabankisheadquar-
tered in region j;b yDs
k, a dummy variable indicating that a bank belongs to
sizeclassk; andbyxijk, atime-averagevalueofbankreturnonassets. Werun
the following regression to obtain estimates of size effects on performance,




This is equation (1) in Boyd and Gertler (1994). We construct two sets of
time-average return on assets, one for the period 1984–1991, and one for the
period1992–2003. Table1presentstheestimatedvaluesofbk forbothsample
periods. We can see that the hump-shaped pattern in the 1984–1991 period
is robust to regional adjustments. Similarly, after 1991, bank performance
becomes a monotone-increasing function of size even after controlling for
regional factors.12
Boyd and Gertler (1994) also investigate the relationship between time-
average loan chargeoffs and bank size. They ﬁnd that for the period
12 We also run a regression where we allowed the coefﬁcients bk to vary across regions
(equation 2 in Boyd and Gertler [1994]). The results were very similar.38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 Size-Performance, Controlling for Regional Effects
Time Period bk Coefﬁcient for Each Asset Size Class
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
1984–1991 -0.0009 0.0009 0.00 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0062
(-2.78)( 2.36) − (-2.40)( -2.52)( -2.60)
1992–2003 -0.0019 -0.0002 0.00 0.0010 0.0018 0.0077
(-7.90)( -0.86) − (1.01)( 1.92)( 1.37)
Notes: We use data for all insured commercial U.S. banks (except credit card banks).
To construct return on assets we divide annual net income by total assets. We take time
averages for each bank that existed in the base year, 1983, across the eight years in
the period 1984–1991. For the period 1992–2003 we follow the same procedure using
1991 as the base year. The k size classes are the same as in Figure 4. The number
of observations in the regression for the period 1984–1991 is 13,964 and for the period
1992–2003 is 11,230. The values in parentheses are t-values.
Sources: Report of Condition and Income Data (Call Report); Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Web page.
1984–1991, the relationship has a U-shape. In other words, small and large
banks tend to have higher chargeoffs to assets than medium-sized banks. This
ﬁnding is taken as further evidence of the possible effects of theTBTF policy.
In Figure 5 we reproduce Boyd and Gertler’s result and provide the same data
for the period 1992–2003. Once again, there has been a change in pattern
between these two periods. For the data after 1991, the relationship between
chargeoff and bank size is monotone increasing. Larger banks tend to have,
on average, riskier loans.
Another variable that can be used as a proxy for bank risk is the variance
of return on assets (see, for example, Berger and Mester [2003]). Boyd and
Gertler (1994) do not compute this variable for their period. We provide this
calculation for both subperiods in Figure 6. It is interesting to see that the
variance of (annual) return on assets has signiﬁcantly decreased after 1991
for all size classes. Also, the variability of return on assets does not show a
monotonic relationship with the asset size of banks. In the 1984–1991 period,
banks with over $10 billion in assets had a variance of return on assets that
was higher than that for the previous size class (those banks with $1 to $10
billion in assets). However, this pattern is lost after 1991.
The data studied here for the period 1992–2003 are consistent with a
banking system that is not necessarily distorted by the perception of potential
TBTF subsidies. Under this interpretation, larger banks give riskier loans
(higher chargeoffs to loans) but have a larger size of operations that allows
themtobetterdiversifythoserisks(lowervarianceonreturnonassets). AlargeH. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 39
Figure 5 Chargeoffs to Loans and Size
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Notes: We use data for all U.S. insured commercial banks (except credit card banks). To
construct chargeoffs to loans we divide annual net chargeoffs by total loans and leases.
We consider each annual observation for each bank as the basic data entry in the calcula-
tion of averages across sizes (i.e., we do not take time averages for each bank). The total
number of observations is around 110,000 for 1983–1991 and 120,000 for 1992–2003.
Sources: Report of Condition and Income Data (Call Report); Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Web page.
size of operations may imply some extra cost, but the riskier loans also allow
these large banks to obtain higher average returns. Ennis (2001) provides a
model of banking where this kind of logic is formally studied.
At the same time, the data for 1984 to 1991 seem perhaps more consistent
with the existence of a TBTF distortion. The natural question to ask then is,
could it be that changes in banking regulation at the beginning of the nineties
have solved the TBTF problem? The effectiveness of FDICIA in controlling
TBTF has been a matter of controversy among experts. For example, Stern
and Feldman (2004) argue that the post-FDICIA regime is not much different
from the pre-FDICIA regime and, as a consequence, if TBTF was a problem40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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Notes: To construct the averages for 1984–1991, we compute the variance of annual
return on assets for each bank existing in 1983 and organize the banks in size classes
according to the average amount of assets they owned in that year. For the period 1992–
2003 we use 1991 as the base year. We only use banks for which we have at least three
annual observations. The total number of observations is around 13,000 for 1983–1991
and 10,000 for 1992–2003.
Sources: Report of Condition and Income Data (Call Report); Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Web page.
before 1991, it is still a problem afterwards.13 No large bank has been in
trouble since the enactment of FDICIA, and it is difﬁcult to determine the
ultimate effect of the change in the regulation.
An alternative explanation for the change in the patterns observed in the
data is that the late 1980s was an unusual period. The idea is that large banks
13According to Stern and Feldman (2004), FDICIA made explicit a set of procedures that
were implicit before 1991. They judge those procedures insufﬁcient to stop TBTF bailouts. For a
more favorable view of the reforms in FDICIA, see Benston and Kaufman (1997).H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 41
specialized in certain activities (loans to less-developed countries and large
commercial real-estate loans) that performed poorly during the second half of
the 1980s. Boyd and Gertler (1994) discuss this interpretation but are very
skepticalaboutitsmerits. Theyarguethatmedium-sizedbanksparticipatedin
thesamesetofactivitiesaslargebanksbutperformedmuchbetter. Then,Boyd
and Gertler conclude that the reason why medium-sized banks outperformed
large banks is that large banks were less risk-sensitive as a consequence of the
TBTF distortion.
It is interesting to note that some of the ﬁndings in this article are in
accordance with the ﬁndings in the empirical literature that investigates the
viability of exploiting market discipline in banking regulation. A signiﬁcant
portion of this literature studies the extent to which bond yield spreads reﬂect
the ﬁnancial conditions of banks. Most of this work ﬁnds that, while during
the early to mid-1980s the relationship between bond yield and bank risk was
weak (presumably due to implicit government guarantees), during the late
1980sandthe1990stherelationshipbecamemuchstronger(see, forexample,
FlanneryandSorescu[1996]andthereviewinFlanneryandNikolova[2004]).
These ﬁndings have been taken as evidence that the TBTF problem has been
mitigated since the beginning of the 1990s. However, Morgan and Stiroh
(2002), using data for the 1993 to 1998 period, still ﬁnd that the behavior of
bond spreads for those banks most likely to be subject to a TBTF policy was
signiﬁcantly different from that of other smaller banks and other debt-issuing
corporations.
The purpose of this section was to provide some evidence to test the view
that TBTF may be a latent problem in the U.S. banking system. Overall,
however, it seems that looking at the data on performance across size classes
does not allow any deﬁnite conclusion.
There are, of course, other ways to look for evidence ofTBTF distortions.
Onemethodologyistolookattheeffectofannouncementsabouttheexistence
of a TBTF policy over the equity value of banks. For example, O’Hara and
Shaw (1990) used this strategy. They found that in September 1984, after
the Comptroller of the Currency testiﬁed before Congress that certain banks
were “too big to fail,” the equity value of those banks increased signiﬁcantly
(relative to the rest of the industry).
Another way to approach the question is to study the effect of mergers on
the value of the claims issued by the merging organizations. Benston, Hunter,
and Wall (1995) study the prices that were bid to acquire target banks in the
early to mid-1980s. They ﬁnd little evidence of a TBTF-subsidy-enhancing
motiveinasampleofU.S.bankmergersduringthatperiod. Ontheotherhand,
Penas and Unal (2004) study changes in the return on nonconvertible bonds
issuedbymergingbanksduringthe1991–1997period. Theyﬁndasigniﬁcant
increase in bondholder returns after a merger and that the increase is non-
monotone with respect to the asset size of the bank. In particular, holders of42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
bonds issued by mid-sized banks (especially those that after merging became
relatively large within the system) are the ones that beneﬁt the most from a
merger. The authors attribute this pattern to a TBTF perception in the market
for bonds.
Yet another methodology is to look at the cost-savings implications of
increases in bank size. Some empirical studies have found that economies of
scaleexhaustatfairlymodestbanksizes($200millioninassets). Ifthisisthe
case, then the existence of larger banks may be the consequence of a TBTF
distortion. However, theempiricalliteratureoneconomiesofscaleinbanking
is far from a consensus. Wheelock and Wilson (2001), for example, ﬁnd that
economies of scale do not exhaust until banks have at least $500 million in
assets and do not ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant diseconomies of scale for larger
banks (see also Hughes, Mester, and Moon 2001).14
3. CONCLUSION
In this article we have formally identiﬁed some basic principles that guide the
behavior of banks interacting under the coverage of a government safety net,
and in particular, a TBTF policy. We also studied some empirical regularities
ofU.S.bankperformanceacrosssizeclassesandevaluatedtheextenttowhich
they provide evidence of a signiﬁcant size and risk distortion originated in a
perceived TBTF subsidy.
Our conclusion is a word of caution. While, in principle, the cost of the
TBTFdistortionscouldbelarge, theavailableevidenceisfarfromconclusive.
This is an important reality to acknowledge. Several policy measures are
currentlybeingconsideredtoreducethepotentialdistortionsinducedbyTBTF
(Stern and Feldman 2004). To the extent that some of these policies create
new inefﬁciencies in the economy (by, for example, limiting the behavior of
banks in particular ways), we need to be able to assess better their potential
beneﬁts. In this respect, then, it seems necessary, if not urgent, to improve our
knowledgeoftheactualmagnitudeoftheTBTFproblemintheU.S.economy.
Our reading on this matter is that the available evidence is very preliminary
and in no way deﬁnitive.
14Assessments by credit rating agencies provide another source of useful information. Stern
and Feldman (2004, Chapter 4), for example, present extensive evidence suggesting that credit
rating agencies are in agreement on the existence of a TBTF policy for large banks.H. M. Ennis and H. S. Malek: Too Big to Fail 43
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